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 SAMPSON code is state-of-the-art, system-level, severe accident analysis code 
developed by the IMPACT Project in Japan to investigate severe accident phenomena in 
light water reactors. SAMPSON code integrates various analysis modules into a single 
code. The present study focuses on gaining greater insight through SAMPSON code 
analyses of the severe accident that occurred at Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1. 
 
As there are structural differences between pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and 
boiling water reactors (BWRs), some additional models are necessary for BWR 
simulation compared to PWR simulation. In addition, BWRs and their primary 
containments have unique features that must be modeled for best estimate severe 
accidents analysis. The reactor core of a BWR consists of an array of fuel assemblies 
with cross-shaped control blades located in the bypass channels between the assemblies. 
Each fuel assembly consists of a fuel rod bundle surrounded by a Zircaloy channel box. 
Under severe accident conditions, oxidation reaction of these metals with 
high-temperature steam material interaction among the B4C/stainless steel, and 
B4C/Zircaloy have a significant effect on the melting and subsequent relocation of the 
control blades and channel box. In addition, there are a large number of independent 
parameters governing heat transfer including radiation heat transfer in the reactor core 
uncovered due to low water level. In the present study, radiation heat transfer model 
between the core structures is improved to predict the reactor behavior more accurately 
in such severe conditions. 
 
During the progress of a severe accident, due to the early depletion of injection water, 
the reactor core is rapidly heated up by decay heat and oxidation reaction energy. BWRs 
have a large number of instrumentation tubes inserted in the core that act as the pressure 
boundary for the reactor. Once the core is heated up, there is a high possibility that 
theses stainless steel tubes will fail. Failure opens a flow path directly from the reactor 
core to the containment. In addition, as steam in the core becomes hot, it heats the 
downstream structures of the reactor coolant systems, which challenges integrity of the 
reactor pressure boundary. The temperature of other structures, such as safety relief 
valves (SRVs) and the main steam line, could exceed design limits and cause failure 
leading to leakage of fission products and steam. Failure time and leakage path flow 
area before manual depressurization have huge effects on accident progression and 
release of fission products. 
 
TEPCO announced that the SRVs of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Unit 1 never were 
manually opened during the accident. However, reactor pressure measured about 1.0 
MPa at 2:43 on March 12. Such unanticipated depressurization might accelerate 
uncovering the core and might prevent early containment failure caused by direct 
containment heating. Using SAMPSON code, I evaluated the reactor depressurization 
caused by failure of the source range monitor (SRM) guide tube, the SRV gasket and 
the main steam line based on the Fukushima accident. Based on the sensitivity analysis, 
I propose two candidate mitigation strategies to depressurize the reactor for the 
management of in-vessel events during the early phase and late phase (after core 
degradation has occurred) of postulated BWR severe accidents. 
 
Concrete findings of the present study are as follows. 
 
1. Improvement of severe accident response models for BWR 
The purpose of the SAMPSON code is to study the progression of potential BWR 
severe accidents that extend beyond the design basis. In the present study, I have 
improved the code with regard to BWR severe accident phenomenology and translation. 
With proper consideration given to the special features of BWR design, it is now 
possible to calculate a reasonable estimate of the response of a BWR facility under 
severe accident conditions. Nevertheless, many areas of uncertainty remain, and there is 
a clear need for additional experimental verification of existing models. 
 
The modified physical models of SAMPSON code in the present study are as follows. 
(1) Core structures oxidation model 
(2) Eutectic reaction of B4C and stainless steel 
(3) Radiation heat transfer model 
A radiation heat transfer model in the radial and axial direction was developed to 
determine relative importance of radiation heat transfer in the cooling of degraded BWR 
cores. (a) Radiation heat transfer in the radial direction plays an important role in 
temperature distribution in the radial direction of the core structures, which has 
significant impact on core degradation and integrity of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) 
during a severe accident. (b) Axial radiation has significant impact on cooling of the 
fuel rod and control rod because it significantly enhances heat transfer in the axial 
direction of the core. 
(4) Fuel cladding creep rupture model 
(5) Stainless steel tubes creep rupture model 
 2. Understanding of Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1 accident progression 
The present study embodies several predictive component failure treatments for the 
SRM guide tube, SRV gasket under high temperature, and potential rupture of the main 
steam line. Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1 analysis consistently predicts SRV gasket failure 
and main steam line creep rupture as the mode of vessel depressurization. 
SAMPSON-predicted results compare favorably against the limited data available for 
RPV, drywell, and wetwell pressures. A detailed analysis of the Fukushima accident is 
helping to confirm the current understanding of severe accident plant response and to 
guide future areas of research to enhance plant safety. 
 
There are known areas of important phenomenological uncertainty in the analyses: (1) 
melt progression and core relocation details, (2) input conditions of observed accident 
sequences, and (3) physical models. These uncertainties can produce differences in 
timing of major events, such as water boildown to top of core, onset of rapid Zircaloy 
oxidation reaction, SRM guide tube and SRV gasket failure time, and lower head 
failure. 
 
3. Candidate mitigative strategies for depressurization 
Based on improved SAMPSON code, sensitive analysis was carried out to analyze the 
influences of failure criteria and leakage area on the reactor pressure boundary. Based 
on the sensitivity analysis, I have proposed two passive depressurization systems in the 
present study. Those systems are (1) Passive SRM guide tubes, and (2) Safety heat-up 
rupture valve. 
 
According to the present simulation on passive SRM guide tubes, in Fukushima-like, 
long-term, station blackout (SBO) accident management, it is not the best option to 
open SRVs during core heat-up if additional heat sink is not available to cool the reactor. 
However, leakage caused by failure of the reactor pressure boundary, such as passive 
SRM guide tubes, can effectively depressurize the reactor but also can delay accident 
progression during core heat-up by causing an optimized leakage area. To prevent early 
failure of the containment caused by leakage through the passive SRM guide tube, the 
latter should be connected to the suppression pool so that it can be used as a passive 
depression system under severe accident conditions. 
 
In addition, the safety heat-up rupture valve failure temperature has significant effect on 
the core degradation process. Failure of the safety heat-up rupture valve can 
depressurize the reactor but also provides sufficient steam to melt part of the core in a 
short period. Meanwhile, the steam flow directly into the drywell causes simultaneous 
over-pressure and overheating of the containment. The safety heat-up rupture valve 
should be connected to the suppression pool, so it also can be used as a candidate of 
passive systems to depressurize the reactor pressure to prevent direct containment 
heating. 
 
I also compared the depressurization strategy of current severe accident management 
guideline (using SRVs) with the passive depressurization strategies to evaluate the 
capability of the passive depressurization strategies in the management of an accident. 
For all strategies, the reactor pressure at the moment of RPV failure is lower enough to 
avoid direct containment heating. The rapid depressurization by opening all SRVs could 
reduce the reactor pressure very quickly. However, high rate of gas discharge causing 
excessive loss of water inventory can accelerate core degradation that leads to early 
failure of RPV. In comparison, the calculations with passive depressurization systems 
delay the time to RPV failure and they may provide more time for the operators to 
recover either AC power or auxiliary feedwater, or to find an emergency source of 
feedwater to maintain the integrity of the RPV. Therefore, passive depressurization 
strategies might be regarded as a better strategy compared to the manual 
depressurization using SRVs. 
 
Leakage area and time of initiation of leakage are two key parameters for passive 
depressurization systems. With the optimization of these parameters, proposed system is 
capable to (1) depressurize the reactor and prevent direct containment heating, (2) 
reduce the total mass of hydrogen generation comparing to the depressurization strategy 
using SRVs, and (3) delay the RPV failure time. There are uncertainties on the effective 
leakage area for both passive in-core guide tubes and passive SRV. Further 
investigation on the failure condition and leakage area is necessary for the application of 
these passive depressurization systems. 
